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EXAMINING THE INTERNAL FACI'ORS DETERMINING THE DISPARITY IN
LOAN PERFORMANCE ACROSS THE COMMERCIAL BANKS IN NIGERIA.

BY
DR. RALPH I. UDEGBUNAM
ABSTRACT

The Nigerian banking ilubutry apem,u:«l snere loan proble.u and 11,q,reeedenutl loues in the
1990s. The severity of the loan proble.., wuil!tl aeross banks d11e largely to dilfettnen in the INud:s'
fi,uuu:ial strategin (or sperifie • attribllln). This paper uaminl!s the empirical ttlationsltip between these
~ s and problem loans at tltne INud:s. A simple modl!I is specified and estimated, 11&ing a pookd
cross-s«tional data.
The empirical nidl!nee strongly s11ggests that dilfen,u:es in management qrudity and lnel ofcndit
risk an the leJ ddenninants ofproblem loans and loan loun at the Nigerian commercial INud:s in the mid1990s. Bowne,; then is also 1111 nidl!,u:e of indinct role of credit poliq, wlticlt appears to s11ggest that
collatt!riZJltion of loans is not a sr,Jficient pan,ntu for loan rr,,a,ment. UNlord>t«lq stringent cndit
ttq,,irements ma, 1"'111 to proble.., ofatherse sel«tion and loan delinq11encies.

L

INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian banking industry experienced serious problems in the 1990s.
Recent financial deregulation provided the impetus for the unprecedented expansion
both in size and number of bank and non-bank financial institutions. The aftermath of
this explosion in the number of financial institutions, and the resultant intense
competition, especially in traditional banking arena, were widespread financial
distress, panic, and bank failures. In addition, banks were also faced with persistent
economic downturn, virulent inflation, heightened political instability, escalating
incidences of fraud and defalcation, and worsening economic and financial conditions
of their corporate customers.
The consequences of all these are an increasing number of delinquent borrowers,
an unprecedented increase in non-performing loans and loan losses, a sharply
decreasing average profitability, and an increasing rate of bank failure. Indeed a large
number of particularly new banks failed during the period, and many were financially
distressed due mainly to loan losses. But despite that banking problems were
Dr. Ralph I. Udegbunam is ofthe Departmenl ofEconomic and Statistics, University ofBenin, Benin City.
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widespread, a significant number of these banks recorded high performance in terms
of loan portfolio and profitability. That is, while some banks became financially
distressed and many failed because of astronomical rise in non-performing loans and
charge offs, a large number of banks appeared to be recording high loan performance
and profitability. The policy question is, what are the underlying causes of this
disparity in the banks' loan portfolio performance? Can it be attributed to external or
exogenous factors beyond the banks' control, such as economic, regulatory, and
political conditions, or to the banks' internal factors (or unique characteristics), such
as credit policy and capital adequacy?
Certainly, the answer to this question will be of great importance to the banking
public, the bank management, and the regulators. Recent studies by Keeton and Morris
(1987), Berger and Deyoung (1997), and Jordan (1998) suggest that, for United States
banks, both external and internal factors account for the variation in loan portfolio
performance. They show that while a substantial part of the variations in problem loans
and loan losses is due to differences in local economic conditions, an equally
significant part of it is as a result of difference in the banks' internal attributes. A
similar study by Huh and Kim (1994) for Japan and Korea find evidence that is not
totally consistent with the findings of the above studies that used a sample of U.S.
commercial banks.
It must be noted, however, that United States has predominantly unit banking
system that usually restricts banks to operate in a particular locality often with a single
office. In such a system, local economic condition is necessarily an important
determinant of bank performance. In contrast, Nigeria has predominantly branch
banking system that does not restrict but permits a single bank to have a network of
branches often scattered all over the country. In this system local economic
conditions and other exogenous events are not expected to exert a significant
differential effects in the bank financial performance.
The primary purpose of this paper is to isolate the internal factors that account
for the disparity in loan performance across the commercial banks in Nigeria. Despite
its importance for regulatory policy, I am unaware of any previous empirical research
in Nigeria that explicitly investigated the factors that determine the differences in the
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severity of loan problems at the commercial banks since deregulation. This study
represents an attempt to provide this needed insight into the nature of the relationship
between the banks• financial strategies and loan performance. The rest of the paper is
organized as a follows: Section II provides a brief review of the literature. Section III
presents a brief discussion of particularly bank - specific factors that cause variations
in loan problems at the commercial banks. In Section IV the empirical methodology
and data for the study are described. Section V presents and discusses the empirical
results. Some policy implications of the results are discussed in section VI, and
Section VII concludes the paper.
Il.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In Nigeria not much has been done to examine the factors that determine the
wide disparity in the severity of loan problems at the Nigerian Commercial Banks
especially in the 1990s. In contrast, there is a fairly voluminous literature on the issue
of loan quality problems in more advance economics, especially United States of
America. Notable among these are studies by Watro (1987), Keeton and Morris (1987),
Nub and Kim (1994), Berger and Deyoung (1997), Jordan (1998), and Keeton (1999).
Most of these studies proposed that the variation in problem loans and loan losses
across commercial banks is determined mainly by general economic and financial conditions, differences in regional economic conditions, regulatory and supervisory policies, and bank internal factors. However a larger number of these studies appears to
emphasize that the disparity in problem loans and losses among commercial banks
depend largely on bank internal factors, such as management quality, bank size,
portfolio composition, cost control, credit policy, capital adequacy, and credit risk.
Different empirical.methodologies have been used by these researchers to
ascertain the validity of these propositions. Some of these studies are based on a
simple descriptive statistical analysis. Specifically, Keeton and Morris (1987), Watro
(1987), and Jordan (1998), employed a variety of simple descriptive statistics in their
analysis. Using essentially t-tests of differences in the means of indicator variables,
and sometimes a canonical correlation analysis which determines the maximum

( B \ L< onomic & f inam ial Rt!vieu lo/. 3Y, .\o. 2

i..,~·

95

correlation between two sets of variables, these studies tried to evaluate the causes of
variability in the severity of loan problems among commercial banks. Another more
frequently used methodology is a multivariate statistical technique, principally a
simple multiple regression analysis, based on a simple equation model. For example,
the studies by Huh and Kim (1994), and Keeton (1999) adopted this approach.
However, the work by Keeton (1999) is among a genre of studies that used vector
autoregression (VAR) in their analysis.
Although these studies used different empirical approach and different samples
and data periods, they seem to share a common methodology in the construction and
use of data. They evaluated bank loan portfolio performance mainly on the basis of
various financial ratios. These ratios are usually computed from banks' balance sheets
and income statements, or from the call reports of income and financial conditions
that banks periodically file with the regulators. Cross - sectional data, computed for a
given sample period, or cross-sectional data pooled over different sample periods have
been generally used by these studies.
The evidence provided by these studies has not been totally consistent.
In particular, external factors such as national and regional economic conditions,
market concentration, and regulatory policies are found by a sizable number of the
studies to be less significant determinants of differences in loan portfolio
performance among commercial banks. However, the studies by Watro (1987), Keeton
and Morris (1987), Berger and Deyoung (1997), and Jordan (1998) provide evidence
that strongly suggests that for United States, both external and internal factors are
almost equally important determinants of loan portfolio performance. In contrast, the
studies by Huh and Kim (1994) for Japan and Korea, Iyoha and Udegbunam (1998) and
Udegbunam (2000) for Nigeria, appear to suggest that internal factors are the key
determinants of banks overall portfolio performance. Overall, there appears to be an
overwhelming evidence of powerful effects of bank internal factors on bank
performance differences; all the studies cited above concluded that bank portfolio
performance depends to a large extent on bank internal characteristics.
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THE CAUSES OF PROBLEM LOANS AND LOAN LOSSES

A variety of factors, some internal and some external, are responsible for
variations in problem loans and loan losses at the commercial banks. Internal or bankspecific factors are those factors that are directly related to the individual bank
operating strategies. They reflect the bank's overall credit policy, management quality,
risk preferences, capital adequacy, level of leverage, structure of loan portfolio, level
of abuses, fraud and embezzlement, and internal culture. This set of factors are under
the control of the bank management. External factors which are outside the direct
control of the bank management include: economics, social and political conditions,
regulatory and policy environment and the market structure. Based on our
presumption that the major causes of variations in the severity of loan problems at the
commercial banks in Nigeria are bank-specific or internal factors, and that
cross - sectional data are used for the study, we focus the discussion on internal
factors.

Poor Management Quality
The most important cause of recent astronomical rise in problem loans and loan losses
at the Nigerian commercial banks is poor management quality. To a large extent the
success or failure of a bank depends on the quality of its management (see Pantalone
and Platt, 1987; Graham and Homer, 1988; Seballos and Thompson, 1990; Iyoha and
Uegbunam, 1998). Bank managers make a myriad of decisions in respect of allocation
of bank resources, internal control, operating expenses, strategic planning, and loan
polices. The surge in the number of new banks since deregulation brought with it,
shortage of skilled bankers, high labour turnover, and employment of inexperienced
managers by banks. Thus poor management of especially the new banks explains the
high rate of problem loans and loan losses at these banks (see CBN/NDIC, 1995;
Udegbunam, 1999)
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Asset Quality Problem - High Credit Risk
Poor asset quality is largely also a repercussion of poor management quality. Making a
loan that has a high probability of default may be deliberate, or may be due to poor job
of evaluating the borrowers' credit worthiness. However, the deterioration in the quality of the banks' assets is partly the result of unfavorable economic and political conditions. Table 3.1. shows the officially reported non-performing loans for the period
1989 to 1996. Both the absolute size of doubtful loans and advances, and the ratio of
doubtful loans and advances - to - total loans and advances indicate serious loan problem in the banking industry. In particular, the ratio of doubtful loans and advances to
total loans and advances for the distressed banks suggest that the major cause of the
distress was high credit risk.

Table 3.1: Asset Quality of Insured Banks.
Year

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

All Insured Banks
Doubtful
Loan &

Distressed Banks
Ratio of

Advances

Loans &
Advances

N'm

N'm

Doubtful
Loans to
total loans

23125
26905
32879
41436
80416
109070
175900
213600

9427
11905
12817
18816
32858
46933
57000
72400

40.8
44.1
39.0
45.4
41.0
43.0
32.9
33.9

Loan&
Advances

Doubtful
Loans&
Advances

N'm

N'm

4270
65005
5380
11556
-

2867

-

Ratio of
Doubtful
Loans to
Total loans

-

67.1
72.8
76.5
64.8
-

-

-

46(5()

4113
7489
-

Source: NIDC Annual Report and statement of Accounts (various issues)
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Capital Adequacy problem
Bank capital performs a number of very important functions. It provides for asset
expansion, absorbs losses, provides cushion against risks, protects uninsured portion
of depositors funds, and maintains public confidence in a bank. The recent deterioration of the banks asset quality, which was largely due to high risk tolerance, has had
adverse effect on the capital and earnings. Most of these banks were initially grossly
undercapitalized; the mounting problem loan and losses worsened the situation, as many
banks failed due to severe capital erosion.
High Financial Leverage
A bank operates with a high degree of financial leverage if it has large amounts of debts
or borrowing. High financial leverage is closely related to high capital risk, as it
exposes the banks to large interest payments, a significant claim on the cash flows that
must be met when the bank is encountering losses. This aggravates capital erosion.
Poor Credit Policy:
A banks credit policy is an important determinant of its long-term performance and
survival. Although banks may, with heightened competition, reduce their credit
standards, poor credit policy often reflects poor management quality. It is closely
associated with high credit risk, high loan losses, and poor performance.
IV.

METHODOLOGY
The objective of this study is to specify and test a simple model relating problem

loans at the commercial banks to the factors that have been suggested as the major
causes, using the banks' balance sheet and income statements data. The explicit goal
of the study is to examine the role of bank-specific attributes or internal factor in the
problem loans and loan losses at the commercial banks in Nigeria. We focus on bank
internal factors because since, with branch banking system, the banks operate in the
same economic, political geographical, policy, and regulatory environment, they are
exposed to the similar external factors.
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Following recent studies by Jordan (1998), and Huh and Kim (1994), a simple
multiple regression model is specified to test the relationship between the banks'
problem loans and bank - specific attributes such as capital adequacy, credit policy,
management quality, level of leverage, and credit risk. However, unlike Jordan, Huh
and Kim, this is a cross-sectional study that focuses on the banks' internal
characteristics. The problem loans rate is specified as:
PLRi =

,,
a + Px + e

Where PLRi is the problem loan rate of bank I; x is a vector of independent variables
(bank-Specific attributes), Bis a vector of parameters to be estimated, a is an intercept
term, and e is the stochastic error term, The elements of the vector x as defined in
equation (4.2) below, are: BER, EQRA, LAR, LDR, UNSLL, LLPEQ, LATML, NITA,
PTEA, and EXLR.
Given the elements of the vector x, equation (4.1) can be expressed as:

PLR1 =

a + P1BER + P2EQRA + l33LAR + l34LDR +

p, UNSLL + P'1-LPEQ +

P1LATML + PsNITA + l39PTEA + P10EXLR + P11UNLTA + e
P1, Pi, 1}4,

p,, P6, P1,

P111. P11 > O;• P2,

Pa. p,

4.5

<o

Where PLR,, as defined in equation (4.1), is measured, for the purpose of this study,
in two different ways:
(i)

NPLA = Non-performing loans-to-total assets ratio;

(ii)

NPLL=Non-performing loans-to-total loans ratio;

and
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BER = Borrowing - to - Equity ratio;
EQRA = Equity - to - risk assets ratio;
LAR = Loans - to - assets ratio;
LDR = Loans - to -deposit ratio;
UNLTA = Unsecured loan - to -total assets ratio;
UNSLL = Unsecured loans - to - loans ratio;
LLPEQ = Loans loss provision - to - equity loans ratio;
LATML = Loan above 12 months - to - total loans ratio;
NITA = Net income - to - total assets ration (ROA)
PTEA = Profit - to - earning assets ratio;
EXLR = Expenditure - to - total liability ratio.
Equation (4.2) is the expanded version of equation (4.1), indicating that the problem
loan rate will change if any of the variable of the specified model changes.
Explanatory Variables And Data
In this study a variety of financial ratios which are derived from publicly available
sources - - balance sheet and income statement of the sample banks - are used to
characterize the factors determining problem loans and loan losses at the Nigerian
commercial banks. These ratios, as the elements of the x vector in equation (4.1), are
the explanatory variables of the model. As shown in Table 4.1, the financial ratios
consulting the variable are categorized into five specific areas of bank performance:
capital adequacy, leverage, credit policy, credit risk, and management quality.

CB\ l.'t ouomic & Financial Review Vol. 39, No. 2
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Table 4.1: Definition of Variables
Expected Signs

Variable

Financial Ratio

Problem Loan Measures
I.NPLA
2.NPLL

Non-performing loans/Assets
Non-performing loans/fotal loans

Capital Adequacy
I.EQRA

Equity/ Risk Assets

Negative

Leverage
2.BER

Borrowing /Equity

Positive

6.LA1ML

Unsecured loans/total Asset
Unsecured loans/Total Loans
Loan loss provision/ Equity
Loan above 12 months/ Total loans

Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive

Credit Rick
7.LAR
8.LDR

Loans/ Assets
Loans / Deposits

Positive
Positive

Net income/ Asset
ProfillEARNING / Assets
Expenditure/fotal Liabilities

Negative
Negative
Positive

Credit Policy
3.UNLTA

4.UNSlL
5.1..LPEA

Management Quality
9.NITA

IO. PTEA
11.EXIR

The a priori signs of the coefficients on the variables (financial ratio) listed in
table 4.1, suggest the relationship between the measures of problem loans (NPLA and
NPLL) and these exogenous variable. It is expected that the severity of loan problems
at the Nigeria commercial banks will be positively related to the financial ratio
measuring leverage, poor credit policy, credit risk, and poor management quality
(EXLR). On the other hand it is expected that the severity of loan problems will be
inversely related to the variables measuring capacity adequacy (adequate capital), good
credit policy, and high management quality. Specifically, the indicators of the severity
of commercial banks loan problems, non-performing loans/Assets (NPLA), and
non-performing loans/total loans (NPLL), are expected to have positive relationship
with borrowings/equity (BER), all the measures of credit policy (UNLTA, UNSLL,
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LLPEA, LATML), all the measure of credit risk (LAR, LDR), and expenditures. total
liabilities (EXLR); but the problem loans indicators are expected to be inversely related to
equity/risk assets (EQRA), net income/assets (NITA), and profits/earning
assets (PTEA).
Based on the above expected relationships, the severity of banks loan problems
will increase with increase in the variable measuring Leverage (BER), poor credit policy
(UNLTA, UNSLL, LLPEA and LATML), Credit risk (LAR and LDR), and poor
management quality (EXLR). On the other hand, the better capitalized a bank is, the
greater the earnings and profitability, and the better the quality of a bank assets, the less
are the probabilities of severe loan problems. The quality of management is crucial in
credit administration, as it determines to a large extent the soundness of credit policy,
and thus the overall asset quality. Poor credit policy manifests in loan problems, the
severity of which is measured by the percentage of non-performing loans, changeoffs, and the consequent capital erosion. Banks experiencing falling profitability and
poor operating performance tend to have high propensity to take greater credit risks
(that is, a high loans-to-assets, or loans -to-deposits ratio), in order to holster their
profits. These banks often end up with chances of severe loan problems.
Undoubtedly, differences in individual bank loan problems and therefore loan
losses are also determined by bank size factors and location. But as argued by Udegbunam
(2000), the use of total assets and total deposits as denominators in computing most
of the financial ratios has considerably controlled for differences in bank size, banks
in Nigeria are not restricted in their geographical location. Banks are free to operate in
any state or location of their choice. In fact some of the large banks have network of
branches all over the country. For these reasons, it is assumed that differences in loan
problem due to location are not significant; also, as banks operate in the same
political, economic, policy, and regulatory environment, they are almost equally
exposed to any problem arising from these factors. The financial ratio used for this
study largely incorporate the effects of these factors on bank loan problems. Thus,
bank internal characteristics are assumed to be the most important factors determining
the magnitude of problem loans at the Nigerian commercial banks.
The sample consists of 24 commercial banks that have complied with tl:e
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recently issued prudential guidelines and the sample period is I 995 to 1996. The
guidelines require banks to report non-performing loans; that is, to classify the loans
portfolio into performing; non-performing; substandard, and bad. A pooled cross-sectional data for these two years are used for model estimation, as time series data for
non-performing loans are not available.

V.

THEEMPRICIALRESULTS

The model is estimated for each of the two measures of commercial banks'
problem loans and loan losses-non-performing loans-to-assets ratio (NPLA), and
non-performing loans-to-total loans· ratio (NPLL). In each case, two different
estimation methods are used: ordinary least square (OLS) method, and inverse
interpolation method. The estimation results for NPLA, as a dependent variable, are
reported in tables 5.1 and 5.2, while the results for NPLL are reported in table 5.3 and
5.4. It is interesting to note that in terms of overall fit the model performs reasonably
well. The results for the two independent variables and from the two estimation
methods are consistent both in terms of parameter signs, and the number of
statistically significant parameter estimates. However, the results obtained using
inverse interpolation method are slightly better than the results from OLS estimation
method; this surprisingly suggests the presence of a little problem of serial
correlation in the OLS estimations.

The Results for NPLA As a Measures of Problem Loan Rate At The Commercial
Banks

The reported three sets of results in each of the table 5.1 and 5.2 show that the
model consistently explains about 64% of the variations in commercial banks
non-performing loans; this is fairly impressive for an essentially cross-sectional
analysis. Thus, this implies that about 64% of differences in non-performing loans
across commercial bank in Nigeria is explained by differences in the banks

104

,

"

Dr. Ualpli I. l'<icgb1111w11

operational efficiencies, as embodied in the financial ratios used. As already not~d,
the Durbin Watson (D.W.) statistic indicates that there is a slight problem of senal
correlation in regression results presented in table 5.1. To ameliorate this problem,
the model was re-estimated using inverse interpolation method, and the results are
presented in table 5.2. Also multicollinearity, which is often present in
cross-sectional data, seems to be a little problem. Since the results presented in table
5.2 are slightly better than the OLS results in table 5.1, we base our analysis on result
in table 5.2.
In column I of table 5.2, the estimation results, using all the eleven explanatory
variables, are presented; columns 2 reports the result obtained using eight explanatory
variables (dropping BER, EQRA, and LLPEQ), and column 3 reports the results
obtained using only five explanatory variables. For each set of results, t-ratios are
reported in parentheses below each parameter estimate, with asterisk denoting various
levels of significances for a test of the hypothesis that the parameter estimate is zero.
The observed sensitivity of the t-statistics of some of the coefficient estimates to
dropping of these variables is an indication of the presence of multicollinearity (see
Farrar and Glauber, 1967).

I
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Table 5.1

Estimation results for NPLA Model, by OLS method.

Independent Variable
INIERCEPf

105

1

2

3

-0.08596
(-1.24781

-0.05495
1-1.36021

-0.05358
· (-1.54371

Bffi

0.00176
(0.4528)

UNLTA

-0.11877*
(-1.65()1))

EQRA

0.03887
(0.7184)

UAR

0.14506
(0.7805)

0.1569
(0.7395)

I.ffi

0.15317*
(15206)

0.17733**
(1.9259)

UNSlL

-0.0455
(-0.6917)

-0.04543
(-0.7230)

ll1'EA

-0.00!95
(-0.1329)

LAM1L

0.01672
(0.4464)

0.01704
(0.4764)

NITA

-0.47704*
(-1.5999)

-0.52014**
(-1.9174)

-0.4136*
(1.7467)

PfEA

-0.2844**
(-2.5515)

-0.27745**
(-2.8932)

-0.31586***
(-3.7974)

EXlR

1.1000***
(3,8857)

1.0034***
(5.1918)

J.0412***
(5.9&'-l)

Adiusted- R2

F. Statistics

=0.6244
=0.0!11
7.9531

0.6485
0.07783
11.8383

0.6635
0.0062
19.5325

D.W

J.6157

J.6696

1.7006

SF.

•

••
•••

Significant at the I 0% level
Significant at the 5% level
Significant at the I% level

-0.11529*
(-1.6866)

-0.1290"*
(-1.9674)

0.20044**
(29200)

l
TableS.2
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Estimation results for NPLA Model, by Inverse Interpolation
1

2

3

INIBRCEPT

-00!35
1-1.2334)

-0.0544
1-137411

-0.0626
1-21031

BER

0.00115

-0.1244*
(-1.8014)

-0.1635**
(-2.6718)

Independent Variable

m1rnn
UNLTA

-0.1298*
(-1.7751)

EQRA

0.0384
<0.7575)

lAR

0.19036
(1.0442)

0.1677
(1.086)

illR

0.1745*
(1.8050)

0.1911 **
(2.145)

UNSIL

-0.03516
(-0.5271)

-0.0319
(-0.5086)

UWA

-0.0026
/-0.0733\

LAM1L

0.(X)l5
(0.1'.Zra)

0.0015
(0.0423)

NITA

-0.6567 **
(-2.2082)

-0.70174**
(-2.6185)

-0.5275**

PI'EA

-0.2388**
(-2.2067)

-0.2286••
(-2.5338)

-0.2087***
(-2.9057)

EXI.R

1.067!••·
13.6739\
0.6225
0.08182
73198
1.7791

0.9879••·
I4.""""'
0.6476
0.0779
10.5976
1.8357

0.9428••·
15.5053,
0.6738
0.0750
14.8718
1.9252

Adiusted- R'
SE.
F. Statistics
D.W
• Significant at the 10% level
••
Significant at the 5% level
••• Significant at the I% level

0.2723••
(4.6491)

(-2.2725)
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Of the eleven explanatory variables in column I of table 5.2, five are statistically
significant, it is remarkable that the same five variable (UNLTA, LDR, NITA, PTEA and
EXLR) are found to be statistically significant in column 2 out of eight explanatory
variables, and in column 3 the five variables are more strongly statistically significant,
with the dropping of six other variables from the model. Clearly, in terms of level of
significance of the coefficient estimates of these five variable, the adjusted - R2, and
Durbin-Watson statistics, the performance of the model increases with successive
dropping of three explanatory variables in column 2, and six variables in column 3. The
increasing improvement of the coefficient estimates of these variables as less
significant variables are dropped, is an indication that some of these variables are
inter-correlated.
Column 3 of table 5.2 reports the results of the preferred problem loans model
on which we largely base our analysis. This model, apart from substantially reducing
the problem of multicollinearity is more parsimonious, as it achieves maximum
goodness of-fit with minimum number of variables. The coefficient on the five
explanatory variables is highly statistically significant and, with the exception of one
(UNTLA), they consistently received their expected sign. That is, of the five financial
ratios, only one has coefficient with counter intuitive sign.
The results appear to suggest that differences in management quality, and level
of credit risk are the key determinants of variations in loan problems and loan losses
among commercial banks in Nigeria. That is, the high loan losses at some commercial
banks and recent wave of bank failures are largely a reflection of differences in the
quality of management and the management risk preferences. There is an overwhelming evidence that the variables measuring management efficiency (NITA, PTEA, and
EXLR) have strong influence on the performance of banks' loan portfolio, and
therefore the size of problem loans and loan losses. The results indicate a consistently
negative and significant relationship between earning efficiency (NITA), or asset
utilization of the banks and problem loans. This implies that increase in earnings would
most likely bring about a significant reduction in problem loans. Specifically, the
results suggest that a 10 percent increase in return on assets (ROA) would be followed
by an averaged of 6 percent reduction in the occurrence of problem loans in
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commercial banks. Similarly, the results suggest a consistently strong negative
relationship between profit efficiency (PTEA) and problem loans, thus implying that
increases in bank profitability would, most likely, result in reduced occurrences of
problem loans at the banks. A 10 percent increase in profitability would be expected to
cause about 2 per cent decline in the size or problem loans in corirant to the relationship between the above two variables (NITA and PTEA) and problem loans, the result
rightly indicates a positive relationship between operating cost (EXLR) and problem
loans.
With high operating cost (cost inefficiency), declining revenue, and falling
profitability, banks trend to exhibits an excessively tolerant attitude towards credit
risk. This was why, as operating cost sky - rocketed, and profitability sharply fell with
deregulation and associated intense competition, a large number of banks failed
because of excessive risk tolerance and consequent high level loan losses (see Doguwa,
1996; Udegbunam, 1999).
The empirical evidence also suggests that commercial bank's preferences for
credit risk, indicated by LOR, significantly contribute to differences in problem loans
and loan losses at these banks. This implies that banks that take excessive credit risks
are much more likely to encounter serious loan problems than banks that are
moderately aggressive in their loan portfolio. In fact, recent studies by Iyoha and
Udegbunam (1998) and Udegbunam (2000) indicte that asset quality problems, an
inherent danger of excessive risk talcing, was a key factor in bank failures in Nigeria in
the early 1990s. During this period lending standards fell with heightened competition
occasioned by deregulation. Banks tended to display an excessively tolerant attitude
towards credit risk in order to bolster their declining profitability. The evidence from
these studies shows that some of these banks became financially distressed, as loan
losses and change-offs rose astronomically with serious consequences on the bank's
capital.
Surprisingly, the coefficient on unsecured loans-to-total assets ratio (UNLTA)
has consistently counter intuitive sign, although statistically significant. Our a priopri
expectation is that banks with high ratio of unsecured-loans to total assets would have
poor credit policy (loss credit standards) and are therefore more exposed to loan
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problems than banks with lower ratio. But the empirical evidence appears to run
counter to this expectation. Clearly, securing a loan does not guarantee it's repayment,
it is earnings and long-term profitability of the borrower that are the best sources of
loan repayment (see Nakamura, 1991). Thus, an undue emphasis on collateral at the
expense of other measure of soundness of a loan, such as proper documentation,
monitoring, and early identification of problem, may actually lead to increased loan
problems. In other words, collateral per se does not ensure loan repayment and is
therefore not a substitute for good credit management.
The evidence provided by these results suggest that capital adequacy, measured
by equity/risk assets (EQRA) and leverage, measured by borrowing/equity (BER), do
not offer any significant help to the explanation of the differences in loan problems
and loan losses among commercial banks in Nigeria. Also the evidence provides
somehow not too clear support for the view that differences in loan problems across
commercial banks are determined by the banks' credit policy. The implication of this
finding is that management remains the most critical factor in bank portfolio
performance. It takes a high quality management to formulate good credit polices and
to ensure compliance with these policies.
The Results for NPLL As a Measure of Problem Loan Rate at the Commercial
Banks.

,

•

The results reported in table 5.3 and 5.4, which are obtained using NPLL as
dependent variable, are virtually the same with the results presented in tables 5.2 and
5.3. Table 5.3 presents the results obtained using OLS estimation method, while in
table 5.4 we have the results obtained by inverse interpolation method. The use of
inverse interpolation method is to correct for what appears to be a mild serial
correlation problem.
As in the case of NPLA model, there are three sets of results in each of the tables
5.3 and 5.4; column 2 and 3 of each of these tables report the results obtained by
successively dropping the variables BER, EQRA, LAR UNSLL AND LLPEQ, whose
coefficient estimates are not statistically significant. These results show that the NPLL
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model is able to explain about 55% of the variation in commercial banks non-performing loans. Again, since the result presented in table 5.4 is slightly better than the OLS
results in table 5.3, the analysis is based on the results in table 5.4. Also, as in the case
of NPLA, column I of table 5.4 reports the results obtained using all the eleven
explanatory variables, column 2 reports the result obtained using eight explanatory
variables, and in column 3 we have the results obtained using only six of the
explanatory variables. Again, the best results are in column 3 of the table, it is more
parsimonious because it achieves a better fit with minimum number of variables.
It is interesting to observe that the five variables: viz, UNLTA, LDR, NITA PTEA
and EXLR, are again consistently statistically significant. Interestingly, also, the signs
of the coefficient estimates of these five variables are perfectly in accord with the
NPLA model results discussed in the previous section. However, unlike the NPLA
results, the variables LATML is found to be significant at the 10% level, though with
unexpected negative sign. That is, in the NPLL results, the estimated coefficients on
two of the variables (UNLTA and LATML) measuring credit policy are statistically
significant, but like the two less significant variables (UNSLL and LLPEQ), are with
negative signs.
This evidence appears to refute the view that banks with high ratio of unsecured
and long-term loans would have more problem loans and loan losses than banks with
,, Iolv ratios. As we have argued in the case of unsecured loans, the logic of this
apparently implausible evidence is that although collateral can induce repayments from
borrowers who can pay, it is not a reliable source of loan repayment if the borrower
defaults. The road to foreclosure of a collateral is tortuous; collateral can be of value
only if the lender can actually make a valid claim, impound, and dispose of it quickly in
the event of default (see Nakamura, 1991 ). It is also argued that imposition of
stringent credit requirements may lead to problem of "adverse selection," where a high
proportion of risky borrowers than safe borrowers could meet the initial credit
requirements but later defaults (see Lacker, 1994). Clearly collateral alone is not a
sufficient guarantee for loan repayments; it must be in combination with close
monitoring of the borrowers' financial conditions, and minimum operating capital
requirements for borrowers. Thus, it may not be surprising that all the variables
measuring credit policy, have negative signs on their coefficients.
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Estimation results for NPLA Model, by OLS Method
1

2

3

INIERCEPT

0.03895
<O.'"WTI

0.0715
f0.4'"'

0.07501
t0.414?'

BER

0.0034
-0.4,373•

-0.4768•

~o,:n

/.I ~AO,:\

Independent Variable

"'~1 l<l'Tl

UNLTA

-0.4724•
1-1 "'"""

F.QRA

(.I

O.O'J26
tnAn~\

lAR

-0.3411
,, n ~"""''

I.DR

0.5545
II

UNSIL

A<,i,:\

03167

"
03988
11 ·,r,m

03917
{I .,.,,.,,

-0.2127
(l\"IO<I\\

l.lIBA

-0.0023
(-0.1484)

-0.0067
(-0.0948

LAM1L

-0.9129
(-0.6029)

-0.)5<,6
(-1.4145)

(-1.4294\

NITA

-1.7113
(-1.4002)

I.9664••
(-1.8659)

-1.9530*•
(-1.8930)

PTEA

-1.4411 •••
(-3.4173)

-1.3972***
(-1.8659)

-1.4033 •••
(-1.8930)

EXLR

4.3030***

4.0444***
,.=

04.0247***

fll:TIQ\

0.5329
03302
5.8742
1.8182

0.5640
0.5640
9.6842
1.6726

0.5745
0.5745
11.5765
1.6719

Adjusted- R'
SE.
F. Statistics

D.W

• S1gmficant at the 10% level
••
Significant at the 5% level
••• Significant at the I% level

-0.1556

,.,-n,
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Table 5.4 Estimation results for NPLA Model, by Inverse Interpolation Method
Independent Variable

1

2

INIERCEPf

0.0415
(0.1505)

0.U753
(0.4888)

0.8337
(0.5690)

BER

0.0025
(0.1614)

UNLTA

-0.5408*
(-1.8186)

-0.5911**
(-2.1665)

-0.5893**
(-2.1856)

EQRA

0.1070
(0.4954)

I.AR

-0.2591
(-0.4024)

0.4635
(0.6765)

I.I:R

0.5800*
(1.5350)

0.5835**
(2.0210)

UNSIL

-0.1512
(-0.5572)

lill'Q

-0.0016
(-0.1078)

-0.0013
(-0.1884)

LAMIL

-0.1288
(-0.8435)

0.1967
(-1.7244)

-0.1951 *
(-1.7355)

NITA

-2.1476*
(-1.7328)

2.7426*
(-2.5741)

-2.7161 *
(-2.6027)

PIEA

-1.3625***
(·3.2179)

-1.1604***
(-3.4433)

-1.1763***
(-3.6281)

EXI.R

4.3545***
(3.5823)

4.0991***
(4.9094)

4.0633***
(5.0732)

Adjusted- R2
SE.
F. Statistics

0.5226
03338
52875
1.8032

0.5455
0.3257
6.6405
1.8741

0.57202
03161
8.8521
1.9683

D.W

* Significant at the 10% level
**
Significant at the 5% level
••• Significant at the I% level

3

0.5670**
(20730)

---------------------------
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The evidence provided by the results in columns 2 and 3 of table 5.4 strongly
suggests that differences in problem loans and loan losses among the commercial
banks in Nigeria are largely determined by variations in six of the financial ratios used;
the six ratios used, are UNLTA, LDR, LATML NITA, PTEA, and EXLR. The results
indicate that excessive credit risk tolerance on the part of bank managers, measured by
Loans/Deposits Ratio (LDR) leads to increase in problem loans. Banks with high ratio
of loans-to-deposits exhibits greater tendency to make loans with a higher probability
of default. This result is also in accord with the general belief that loans have much
greater default risk than other bank assets.
Not surprisingly, the results again consistently provide strong support for the
"management qualities" hypothesis. That is, the evidence strongly suggests that poor
management quality is the major driving force behind the problem loans at the Nigeria
commercial banks. Poor management quality manifests in different ways including the
managers' inability to make sound loans, control operating cost effectively raise
revenue to ensure adequate profit. Thus, the estimated negative relationship between
net income/assets (NITA) and the severity of loans problems is an evidence in support
of poor management quality, which characterized the Nigeria banking sector in the
early 1990s (see Iyoha and Udegbunam, 1998; Udegbunam, 1999). Indeed, managers
at financially troubled banks often tried to bolster the banks sharply declining
profitability by taking excessive risk. The problem with this strategy (high risk tolerance) is that the probability of good return on assets (ROA) is small, while there is a
high probability of losses. This was partly why, in the early 1990s, most of these bank
become financial distressed and many failed.
In contrast to the result recently reported by Berger and Deyoung (1997), and
Jordan (I 998), there is a strong evidence of negative relationship between profit
efficiency, measured as profits/earning assets (PTEA), and the problem loan rate (PLR).
This evidence is in accord with the management efficiency hypotheses, inefficient
management usually has difficulty in making sound loans and in controlling costs. The
result is low profitability and rising problem loans. Also, there is a strong evidence of
positive relationship between cost efficiency, measured as total expenditure/total
liabilities (EXLR) and the problem loan rate. Again this evidence supports the
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proposition that poor management quality, through cost inefficiency and poor loan
portfolio performance, exerts a strong positive effects on problem loan rate. That is,
as already noted inefficient management finds it difficult to contain cost and increase
revenue and profitability.
In conformity with the NPLA model results reported in table 5.2 and 5.3, capital
adequacy as measure by equity/risk assets (EQRA) ratio, and leverage, measured by
borrowing/equity (BER) ratio are found to have trivial effects on the problem loan
rate. None of these two variables exerts any statistically significant effect on the size
of problem loan at the banks. This evidence is somewhat surprising. While it is argued
that managers of poorly capitalized banks tend to be more aggressive in their loan
portfolio, which leads to loan losses (see Kane, 1989, Keston, 1999) recent studies by
Furlong (1992) and Jordan (1998) find a positive relationship between bank capital
and the size of bank loan portfolio. The only conclusion we can draw from these
apparently contradictory findings is that capital ratio may not be a leading indicator of
potential problems in banks.
VL

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The dramatic increase in problem loans and loan losses at the Nigerian
Commercial banks since the early 1990s present a serious challenge to bank
management, regulators and policymakers. The surge in the number of new banks and
nonbank financial institutions, and the expansion of the existing banks since
deregulation, generated intense competition in the banking industry. Apart from stiff
competition in the financial services offered, banks also competed aggressively for
the small pool of available qualified and experienced personnel in the banking industry.
The immediate consequences are high operating cost, high labour turnover, and sharply
falling profitability (see Udegbunam, 1999)
The empirical evidence presented above appears to suggest that the banks responded to
declining profitability and shortage of qualified bankers by pursuing riskier strategies
in their lending, staff recruitment and other personnel policies. That is, to bolster
dwindling profits most of the banks tended to be increasingly inclined to take greater
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credit risk, and to recruit poorly trained and inexperienced "Zombie" managers. Some
of the banks, in particular the new ones, aggressively competed for qualified bankers
by offering salaries far above the industry average, and this mounted further upward
pressure on operating cost. The increased deterioration of the loan quality, mounting
loan losses, and the fragility of the entire banking system, stemming from high credit
risk poor management quality, have wide implications for management, and official
regulatory and supervisory policies.
A first step to achieving a safe and sound banking practice that will minimize loan
losses, increase efficiency, and promote financial stability, is to install a strong corporate governance. A bank's board of director has many important responsibilities. These
responsibilities include hiring of the bank's management team, formulating policies,
setting objectives, and ensuring management compliance with policies. Thus the installation of a strong board of directors is undoubtedly a first line of defense against
potential banking problems, including credit quality problems.
In addition, there is need for constant evaluation and strengthening of the supervisory framework for assessing management competence. In this ever changing banking and financial environment management - focused supervisory framework should
be flexible and adaptable. With adequate supervisory framework and regular monitoring, banks will be encouraged to have on their boards people with good education,
relevant experience, integrity and courage. The members of the board should not only
be experienced and.active, they should also have vested interest by means of strong
ownership position in the banks. With greater financial stakes, members of the board
would most likely have greater motivation to complement official supervision by
closely monitoring and supervising the bank's management.
The board and senior management should set policies that will ensure that
potential employees of the bank are adequately screened for a good and relevant
education, a track record, and integrity. A good personnel policy could encourage
efficiency and integrity; it should make provision for training, adequate compensation,
and other performance incentives. The bank senior management should ensure that
adequate compensation performance incentives, and the entire corporate culture go
down the lines of management.
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The strong evidence of high credit - risk provided by this study appears to
suggest that both internal credit risk management and official supervisory framework
for assessing credit risk exposure of these banks are not adequate. With rapidly
changing banking market Structure and increasing complexity of the loan market, there
is need for a more dynamic approach to credit risk management and indeed the entire
internal control system. This approach should provide, among other things, a
comprehensive guide for standard practices regarding credit risk management, such as
credit limits, credit standards or criteria, credit risk monitoring, and audit and control
procedures. The regulators and the banks' management should ensure that banks
comply with prudential regulations, applicable laws and regulations, and official
lending policies and procedures. It is the joint responsibility of the banks'
management and regulators to ensure that future credit quality problems are avoided
through a sound credit risk management and internal control system.

VIL CONCLUSION

This paper examines the determinants of differences in problems loans at the
commercial banks in Nigeria, in the mid-1990s, the period of widespread financial
distress and bank failure. It is recognized that there are two groups of factors that
constitute the driving force behind the problem loans at the commercial banks. First
are the external (or exogenous) factors, which are outside the control of the bank
management, such as general economic condition, social and political environment,
and policy and regulatory environment. Second are the internal (or endogenous) factors that are largely within the control of the management, such as lending policy, level
of leverage, and level of risk tolerance. An important and perhaps valid assumption is
that since the banks are not localized but have network of branches all over the country,
they are exposed almost equally to the external factors. In other words, differences in
the banks' problem loan rate are assumed to be determined primarily by differences in
the banks' internal factors, or what we have referred to as financial strategies.
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With this assumption, a simple model is formulated and estimated using pooled
cross-sectional data. The evidence from the estimation results strongly suggests that
differences in management quality and level of credit risk are the key determinants of
problem loans and loan losses at the Nigeria commercial banks in the mid- 1990s. Of
the eleven financial ratios used to proxy bank internal characteristics, four appear to be
most critical factors determining differences in problem loan rate and loan losses
among commercial banks. Of the four critical factors, three (NITA, PTEA and EXLR)
are indicators of management quality, and one (LDR) is an indicator of credit risk. That
is, there is overwhelming evidence that poor management quality and high credit risk
are the major driving force behind the problem loan at the Nigeria commercial banks.
Thus, the persistent high loan losses at some of the banks and recent wave of financial
distress and bank failures are largely the result of poor management quality and the
management's increased incentive for excessive credit risk.
An additional notable finding is the somehow indirect but important role of credit
policy in loan performance. Of the four financial ratios used to proxy credit policy,
two (UNLTA and LAMTL) are found to individually exert significant but unexpected
negative effect on problem loan rate. However, for the loan rate measured by NPLA,
only one (UNLTA) of the indicators of credit policy is statistically significant with
counter intuitive sign. The implication of this apparently implausible finding, is that
securing a loan can induce repayment from the borrowers who can pay, but clearly
collateral is not a reliable source of repayment if the borrower defaults. In fact, heavy
reliance on collateral and other stringent credit requirement may lead to problem of
"adverse selection", hence the negative parameter estimates of these two financial
ratios.
Finally, the evidence shows that capital adequacy and financial leverage have individually only trivial effect on loan performance. Overall, the finding of this study
suggests that management quality is the most critical factor determining performance
difference among commercial banks. It take a high quality management to formulate a
sound credit policy; a prudent credit administration and risk management can significantly alleviate the present problems in the Nigeria banking industry.
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